

DANA 77–78, PORTUL CONSTANȚA 5 Iunie 2026

- 06:20 – DRONA OBSERVATĂ DE ARSVOM
- 10:00 – UCRAINA NOTIFICĂ PIERDEREA CONTROLULUI
- 10:28 – EXPLOZIE ÎN DANA 77–78



POLONIA A CONVOCAT
AMBASADORUL UCRAINEI
A REMIS O NOTĂ VERBALĂ
DE PROTEST DIPLOMATIC
SOLIDARITATE ȘI DEMNITATE
POT COEXISTA

SCRISOARE DESCHISĂ

privind absența răspunsului diplomatic al statului român
în urma incidentului din dana 78, Portul Constanța, 5 iunie 2026

- 1 A fost convocat ambasadorul Ucrainei la MAE ca urmare a incidentului?
- 2 A fost remisă o notă verbală de protest diplomatic sau o solicitare de explicații?
- 3 Au fost activate protocoalele bilaterale de notificare mutuală în caz de incidente cu sisteme autonome de armament?
- 4 Care este pragul de la care interesul național teritorială a României devine un drept exercitat concret – inclusiv față de aliați?

România există ca subiect de drept internațional.
Cu respect,

General locotenent (r)
Ion Dan Zaharia
Membru fondator
Clubul Seniorilor pentru Înzestrarea Armatei (CSIA)
București, 7 iunie 2026



INTERES
NAȚIONAL
DEMNITATE
RĂSPUNS
DIPLOMATIC

SOLIDARITATEA CU ALIAȚII NU EXCLUDE RESPECTUL DE SINE.
DEMNITATEA NU ESTE O OPȚIUNE. ESTE O OBLIGAȚIE.

CLUBUL SENIORILOR PENTRU ÎNZESTRAREA ARMATEI

Senior Club for Army Procurement • www.csia.ro

To:

H.E. Oana-Silvia ȚOIU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania
Bucharest

LETTER

concerning the absence of a diplomatic response by the Romanian state
following the incident at Berth 78, Port of Constanța, 5 June 2026

I. The Facts — as publicly known

On the morning of 5 June 2026, at 10:28, a Ukrainian military maritime drone exploded at berths 77–78 of the Port of Constanța, in the immediate vicinity of critical national infrastructure — the Oil Terminal and liquefied gas loading berths. The drone, identified as belonging to the MAGURA V5 family, was first visually observed in the port at 06:20 by personnel of the Romanian Agency for Search and Rescue at Sea (ARSVOM).

Ukrainian authorities notified Romania that they had lost control of four drones only at approximately 10:00 — roughly four hours after the drone was first observed in the port — and a mere 10 to 15 minutes before the explosion. This extremely narrow margin allowed

the withdrawal of intervention teams, thereby avoiding casualties, but did not permit any meaningful preventive action.

Ukraine officially attributed the loss of control to Russian electronic sabotage (GPS spoofing). This explanation is technically plausible, but has not been independently verified, and does not eliminate responsibility for the concrete consequences: an active military drone, with a potential payload of up to 320 kg of explosives, penetrated and detonated on the territory of a sovereign NATO member state.

II. The Polish Precedent — the same principle, a different response

In November 2022, a Ukrainian missile — used to intercept a Russian projectile — fell on Polish territory near Przewodów, killing two civilians. The context was unambiguous: no hostile intent towards Poland, no ambiguity regarding Russia's initiating responsibility.

Nevertheless, Poland immediately summoned the Ukrainian Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, requested formal explanations, and delivered a verbal diplomatic protest note. The gesture was regarded as entirely appropriate by the international community — consistent with Alliance solidarity, necessary from the standpoint of national sovereignty, and without any negative consequences for the bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

Romania and Poland occupy comparable geo-strategic positions within the North Atlantic Alliance: NATO member states with borders exposed to the conflict in Ukraine, bearing Eastern Flank responsibilities, with civilian populations and critical infrastructure alike at risk. The difference in institutional response between the two states in the face of comparable incidents raises a question to which Romanian citizens await an answer: **why does a principle applied without hesitation in Warsaw become negotiable in Bucharest?**

III. Questions to which the Romanian state has not publicly responded

The undersigned, as a Romanian citizen and officer in reserve, addresses the following questions of public interest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the clarification of which is considered urgently necessary:

1. Was the Ukrainian Ambassador summoned to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the incident of 5 June 2026?
2. Was a formal verbal note of diplomatic protest, or a request for formal explanations, delivered by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its Ukrainian counterpart?
3. Were bilateral mutual-notification protocols activated in connection with incidents involving autonomous weapons systems in the vicinity of Romanian territory? If not — do such protocols exist?
4. What, in the Ministry's view, is the threshold at which Romania's territorial sovereignty becomes a concretely exercised right — including vis-à-vis allies — rather than a merely stated principle?

IV. The signatory's position

This letter is not an indictment of Ukraine, a sovereign state engaged in an existential war, nor a gesture of rupture with Alliance solidarity. Ukraine remains our strategic partner, and support for its right to self-defence is an unwavering position.

This letter is, rather, a call for adherence to an elementary principle of the rule of law and international order: that any incident with consequences on the territory of a sovereign state, regardless of its author or the circumstances of its occurrence, warrants a formal, proportionate, and dignified diplomatic response. Not to escalate — but to affirm that Romania exists as a subject of international law.

Poland has demonstrated that these two things — solidarity with Ukraine and the sovereign dignity of one's own state — **are not incompatible**. Romania owes it to its citizens to demonstrate the same.

Respectfully, and with the conviction that institutional clarity serves the national interest,

Lieutenant General (ret.) Ion Dan Zaharia

Founding Member — Senior Club for Army Procurement (CSIA)

Bucharest, 7 June 2026

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